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1
EXX
CORP. v. GOV. OF MARYLAND
ELL OIL CO. v. GOV. OF ~~RYLAND
CONTINENTAL OIL CO . v. GOV. OF MARYLAND
GULF OIL CORP. v. GOV. OF MARYLAND
ASHLAND OIL, INC. V. GOV. OF MARYLAND
1. SUMMARY:

~";]

from Md. CA (Eldri dge
~urphy, C.J., ~ 3 J J .
of the CA; + two As soc. J J .
of the Ct. of Special
Appeals, specially assigned )
State/Civil (Timely)

Each of the appellants challenges the validi t y,

under federal constitutional and statutory law, of a recently
enacted Maryland statute concerning the marketing of petroleum

-

products.
1

Appellants predicate jurisdiction on 28 U.S.C. §1257(1).

~here · are also three motions for leave to file amicus briefs.

- 2 2. FACTS:

The focus of these appeals is Chapter

854 of the Laws of Maryland of 1974, as amended by Chapter
2

608 of the Laws of 1975.

These chapters, which are reproduced

in the appendix to this memorandum, add important
new provisiors to the Maryland ._ Motor Fuel :nspection Law.
At the risk of oversimplification, the key aspects of
the statute can be summarized as follows.

Section B

forbids a petroleum producer or refiner from opening a retail
service station operated by company personnel.

Section C

requires petroleum producers and refiners to divest themselves
of company-operated service stations.

Section D requires

every producer, refiner, and wholesaler of petroleum products
supplying gasoline and special fuels to retail service stations
to extend all voluntary allowances (i.e., reductions in fuel
prices) uniformly to all retail service stations supplied.
Section F requires that every producer, refiner, or wholesaler
of petroleum products apportion uniformly all gasoline and special
fuels to all retail service stations during fuel shortages.
Chapter 854 was signed into law on May 31, 1974·,
effective July 1, 1974. In June 1974, Exxon instituted
an action in

Md Circuit Court, seeking a declaratory judgment

that Chapter 854 (the Chapter 608 amendments were later incorporaed
in the suit) is unconstitutional and invalid.

Additionally,

It is codified in Maryland Code (1956, 1972 Repl. Vol., 1976
Cum. Supp.) Art. 56 §157E.

.,.
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Exxon sought injunctive relief prohibiting enforcement of
Chapter 854.

Thereafter, other oil companies intervened.

The Circuit Court granted appellants' motion for partial

-

sununary jud~ent as to $et:tion. D, · rhoHling
that provision to be in conflict with and preempted by
provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act.

The Circuit Court

later entered a final judgment and decree declaring the statute violative of the due process and equal protection clauses of
the federal Constitution and invalid as a taking of appellants'
property without just compensation. The challenge to the
statute under the C0rnmerce clause was rejected.

Upon appeal

to the Maryland Co1rt of Appeals, the decision of the trial
court was unanimously reversed and the statute was upheld
against all of the different challenges.
At trial, extensive evidence was presented relating to the
nature of the retail marketing of gasoline and petroleum products in Mary•
land

and the alleged impact that the statute would have on

industry.

Oil company officials testified that the Act would

adversely affect consumers.

They testified that by prohibiting

producers and refiners from operating retail service stations,
producers and refiners would lose the control over operations that
is necessary to gauge accurately consumer preferences for such

- 4 innovative features as self-service stations, car wash facilities,
and total car care service facilities offering a national
guarantee, thus allegedly depriving the consumers in

~ryland

of the wide variety of automotive services now available.The oil execu3
fivf;'S also testified that company-operated service stations
serve as training centers for independent dealers.

4
Additionally, executives of the three companies in
Maryland that market solely through company-operated
stations asserted that their type of low price-high volume stations
could not be economically run with non-company personnel.
Thus, according to the testimony, they would probably be forced
to withdraw from the Maryland market if the Act were to become
effective.
Four economists, qualified as expert witnesses, also testified
on behalf of the oil companies in opposition to the Act.

In

general, they believed tbe Act would reduce competition and
would therefore be detrimental to the interests of the
consumer.

This reduction of competition would occur because,

in their view, the Act would inhibit new competitors from
entering the market, force existing, aggressive independent
marketers out of the market, and would limit the variety

3 "Company-operated" station ·"refer to a retail service station

operated directly by employees of a refiner or producer of petroleum
products, or a subsidiary of a refiner or producer. It does not refer
to retail service stations operated by a company engaged only in the
marketing of petroleum products.

4

Ashland, Petroleum Marketing, and Kayo.
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of auxiliary services available to consumers by discouraging
tests of innovative marketing techniques.
The State presented as its expert witness a Dr. Patterson,
who is a professor of Business Administration and the author of
two books on gasoline marketing. He testified that, in his opinion,
the Act would actually enhance competition in gasoline marketing.
Elimination of company-operated stations would preserve "intertype
col'lpetition" which he described as competition among
the various types of

in the marketplace, such as
5
private brand, major brand, and non-integrated marketers.
competitQrs ~

On the other hand, increased company operation of service stations

would, in his view, enable major, integrated oil companies
to use i,ncreased profits, resulting from the recent increases
in crude oil prices, to drive various "price competitors"
from the market as well as divert available gasoline supplies
from independent, unbranded marketers.

Such actions would, eventually,

reduce overall competition in gasoline marketing.

Evidence was

also adduced by the State to show that several partialYor fully
integrated oil companies planned either to increase the number
of company-operated stations or to convert all stations to company
5 The designation. of "major" and"non-major" (or "priv-ate")
producers and refiners is that of the Lundburg Survey, an industry
statistical organization.
There are apparently 37 private-brand
producers and refiners who presently do some marketing in the U.S.
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operations.

This, the State argued, tended to support

Dr. Patterson's opinion that the major oil companies would seek
to reduce competition among gasoline marketers by reducing the
number of competitors.
Considerable evidence was also introduced concerning
the history and purpose of the challenged statute .

This

indicated that the legislation was prompted by a study of gasoline
retailing in Maryland undertaken by the Comptroller at the
request of the governor.

The study concluded that, in

times of apparent gasoline shortage, company-operated
stations "were virtually unaffected insofar as gasoline availability
was concerned" while both branded and unbranded independents
experienced "the greatest difficulty in obtaining gasoline"
and the "greatest cost per gallonr.- increase."
After legislation designed to correct these inequities had been
proposed, the state Senate and House Committees with responsibility
for the legislation held public hearings on the bills. Representatives
of the major oil companies appeared at the hearings in opposition
to the proposed legislation.
3. CONTENTIONS:

Four distinct arguments are f~rwarded by

the various · appellants ·

and amici as to why the Maryland

statute is invalid--two constitutional and two statutory.

- 7 First, . it is argued

6

that the divestiture' provision of the stat-

Ute is an invalid exercise of the police power in violation

of due process. Secondly, the statute is said to violate
the commerce clause in denying out-of-state

co~petitors

access to local retail gasoline markets and thus discriminating
against interstate commerce.

Third, the oil companies allege

that Section F of the statute conflicts with and is thus
preempted by the Federal Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act
of 1973 (FEPAA).

Fourth and last, the oil companies allege

that Section D is inconsistent with the Clayton Act as amended
by the Robinson-Patman Act. 15 U.S.C. §13 (1970).
The details of these contentions are given,infra.
4. DISCUSSION ·
a.) Due Process: Appellants' due process argument was the

6

Not all of the four contentions were pressed by each of the
appellants or by each of the amici. Most of the briefs concentrated
on the commerce clause and Robinson-Patman issues.
The three motions for leave to file amici briefs in support
of appellants (with the attached briefs) should, I believe, be
granted. The State opposes one such motion by the Chamber of Commerce
on the mutually inconsistent grounds that a) the arguments presented by
the Chamber of Commerce are duplicative of the arguments of the
appellants and b) that the State should not be burdened by having
to respond to additional arguments. The State also opposes
the motion for leave to file submitted by Champlin Petroleum Co. ,
et al. The contents of Champlin's brief and the reasons for _allowing
it to be filed are considered infra in Section 4(c).

- 8 one they relied on most heavily below. They contended, as the trial cour
held, that the divestiture provisions of the statute (Sections
Band C) are an invalid exercise of the State's police
power. rNotwithstanding the emphasis with which this
point was apparently pressed in the Maryland CA, it has
now been all but abandoned.

Only one of the jurisdictional

statements and one of the amicus briefs even raise the issue.
These two briefs (by Continental Oil Co., et · al, and
Pacific Legal Foundation) argue that the Maryland statute
lacks a rational relation to any constitulonally permissible
objective.
the CA.

This contention was effectively answered by

It began by noting that the function of the courts

in reviewing, under the due process clause, state legislation
on economic regulation is "v..ery limited."

Quoting extensively

from this Court's decisions, the CA held the Ac't to -be
easily immune from judicial invalidation.

The CA acknowledged

that the oil companies had presented evidence questioning the
wisdom and efficacy of the Act but held that

~hey

had not shown the Act

be "arbitrary" or that there are "no considerations relating to

.

the public welfare by which it can be supported." In short,
the CA's . opinion on this point appears to have properly applied
well-established constitUional principles to the facts before it.
Furthermore, most of the appellants have all but conceded the correctn
of the CA's conclusion.

l
I

l

- 9 · b.) Commerce clause: The contention that the Maryland
statute runs afoul of the commerce clause is more troubling.
The CA considered several Supreme Court decisions

that _: ~ t ruck

down state statutes regulating the production and sale of
a commodity as violative of

clause.

the\~.comrnerce

Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340

u.s.

349 (1951); H.P. Hood & Sons

v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig,
U.S. 511 (1935).

~94

TheCA proceeded to distinguish the Maryland

statute from the statutes considered in those cases on three
different grounds.

First, the CA stated that the Maryland

statute would not restrict the free flow of petroleum
products.

According to the CA, the statute regulates a wholly

intrastate activity, the retail marketing of gasoline . .. :.Producers
and refiners would still remain free to import and sell petroleum
products to wholesalers and to service station dealers.
Secondly, the Gourt relied on

legislative

history in asserting that the purpose of the statute was to
preserve competition within the Maryland retail gasoline
marketing industry.

Its purpose was not, in the Court's view,

to protect local economic interests from the competition of oil
companies engaged in interstate commerce.

- 10 Third, the Court stated that the statute does not have
the effect of discriminating against out-of-state economic interests
in favor

of ·

· local interests.

The statute is equally

applicable to all producers and refiners, the Court pointed
out.

It did concede, however, that petroleum is not now

produced or refined in Maryland and never has been.
The Court also applied the three-pronged "balancing
test" developed in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137,
142 (1970) (a unanimous opinion), recently reaffirmed in
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366,
371 (1976) (unanimous except for Stevens, J. who did not
participate). That test provides that, once the Court finds
that a . "challenged exercise of local power serves to further a
legitimate local interest but simultaneously burdens interstate
connnerce," then:
[1] the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will . . .
depend on the [2] nature of the local interest involved,
and on [3] whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser
impact on interstate activities.
See also Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission,
45 U.S.L.W. 4746 (June 20, 1977). Under this test, theCA
concluded that "the divestiture provisions of the Act do not
violate the Connnerce Clause."
The appellants vigorously attack the reasoning of the CA.
)

They reject the CA's assertion that the statute regulates

- 10 a wholly intrastate activity," noting that the sale of petroleum
products which are transported into a state has been regulated
by Congress not only under the antitrust laws but also under
the FEPAA.

The appellants further note that this eourt

has held that the fact that a state law may strike some
in-state interests as severely as it strikes out-ofstate interests does not immunize it from a commerce clause
challenge.

Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U.S. 416,432 (l946).

Moreover, the appellants believe the CA gave undue emphasis
to the fact that the statute does not forbid producers and
refiners from transporting petroleum into Maryland for sale.
The appellants proceed to argue that the statute does
violate the commerce clause--and lessen competition in Maryland-in four ways.

First, the statute forces vertically integrated

oil companies, such as Exxon and Shell, that engage in producing
and refining to divest themselves of the approximately 209
retail gasoline stations that they now operate in Maryland.
Second, the

appellancs ; claim that the Act makes it difficult

for producers or refiners not currently distributing their
products in the Maryland market ever to enter that market.
The appellants point to their previous experience in attempting

.•

to enter new state markets where they lack a brand image and
are unfan1iliar to the consuming public.

In

such a situation, it is

- 11 -

alleged, oil companies find it profitable to run their own
retail operations until they build a volume of trade that makes
it attractive for an independent dealer to lease a station
from the company.

Because companies of the size of Exxon have

found it necessary to operate their own stations for a while
before entering a new market , marketers with fewer resources
would find it at least as difficult.

Thus, the oil companies

assert that the trial court was correct in finding that
the seatute would keep out of Maryland major brand and, especially,
private brand p.r t>ducers and refiners who currently market
elsewhere out'·'not j.n Maryland.
Third, the appellants allege that the Act makes it
economically prohibitive for integrated private brand
marketers, who are now marketing in Maryland, to continue
marketing their products there.

This is said to be so because

private brand marketers sell brands of gasoline that tend to
have less consumer recognition in a given market and must retail
their product at prices lower than those at which advertised
brands are sold.

The

appellants . clai~

that the private

brand marketers have tried dealer operations and found that they
cannot compete effectively because, inter alia, under the antitrust
laws they cannot control the price of the products sold.

- 12 -

Fourth, the statute inhibits, according to the appellants,
private brand marketers of gasoline that are not currently
producers or refiners from integrating backwards into
refining or production of petroleum products.

Alternatively,

the statute would drive such private brand marketers
out of Maryland if they did choose to integrate backwards.
Turning to the balancing test of Pike v. Bruce Church. supra,
and Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cottrell, supra, the
appellants challenge the "legitimate local interests" that
the CA found to outweigh the burdens which the statute places
on interstate commerce.

The appellants point out that the

CA's conclusion on this point was

based

on

only two findings.

First, the CA noted that during the period of the gasoline
shortage in 1973, some company-operated stations received
greater allocations of gasoline than did dealer-operated
stations, forcing many dealers out of business.

Secondly,

the CA stated that there was evidence that certain oil companies
intended to increase the number of company-operated stations,
from which the Maryland General Assembly might have concluded
that this trend,"if allowed to continue," could substantially
decrease competition and lead to the control of that market by
a few major oil companies.

The appellants argue that these

CA findings must be considered in light of the trial court's

- 13 finding--and what they allege was the State's concession
7
on appeal--that retail marketing of petroleum products
in Maryland is, at present, "highly competitive." App. D,
p. 99a. The appellants argue that neither finding justifies
measures as drastic as those adopted in the challenged statute.
They further assert, rather weakly, that less drastic (but
sufficient) measures have already been adopted nationwide in
the FEPAA and

·> .

·-the regulations promulgated thereunder.

In overview, it seems clear that neither the §tate's
arguments nor those of the appellants can be easily dismissed.
Applying the three-prong balancing test of Pike and Great A & P
Tea Co. is, therefore, difficult.

The first factor to be

considered--the extent of the burden--is, of course, what
the oil companies stress.

And even discounting their more

extravagant claims, they are correct in stating that the statute
will impose some substantial hardships.

This was found by

the trial court and, indeed, is all but self-evident from the language
of the statute.

The · burden falls most heavily on the three appellants

7

To support their contention that the State conceded this
point, the appellants cite the State's brief in theCA at p. 7.
That brief is not among the documents included in the appendix
submitted to this Court.

- 14 that market exclusively through their private brand, company8
operated stations. Officials of these companies indicated at
trial that they might be forced to withdraw from the Maryland
market if the statute were to become effective. (However, at least
two of these company witnesses on cross-examination
indicated that no firm decision had been made to withdraw
if the

statute~became

effective, and that it still might be

possible to distribute products in Maryland through dealer
operations and on the wholesale market.)
The second factor in the Pike-Great A & P Tea Co.test-the nature of the state interest--was expressly considered by
the CA.

The

findin~that

and dimensions· of

theCA felt reflected the existence

}~ryland's

interest were, as noted supra,

the gasoline shortages at some of the dealer-operated stations
during the 1973 gasoline crisis and the evidence that certain
oil companies intended to increase the number of company-operated
stations. The -"appellants do not deny that such findings

show

that there is a cognizable state interest at stake.
8

The major brands currently marketing in Maryland have,
in the past, operated only a small percentage of the retail
service stations which they supply. The burden on them, though
real, is not severe. As discussed, supra, however, the statute
would make it considerably more difficult for major
brand or private brand integrated companies that are not now
marketing in Maryland to begin business operations there (i.e.,
by supplying gaa ~ to independent dealers).

- 15 But, as the appellants stress, the relation of this
second factor to the third factor is more complex.
A respectable argument can be made that these local
interests could be promoted as well with a lesser impact
on interstate commerce.

Although it seems facile to

argue (as the appellants do) that existing federal laws and
regulations are sufficient to handle the perceived problems
in petroleum marketing, less sweeping state statutes would
probably suffice. Certainly the fear that
some oil companies intend to

:i;.ncreas~

the number of company-

operated stations could have been alleviated simply by
~J

prohibiting the companies from opening such new stations.
The extra requirement of divestiture of existing, companyoperated stations is more than is necessary to serve the
asserted interest.

Similarly, the possibility of company-operated

stations receiving greater allocations of gasoline
than dealer-operated stations during fuel crises would also
seem susceptible to a solution short of the divestiture required
by Section C. Indeed, prevention of misallocation of petroleum
products by producers and refiners during fuel shortages is
precisely the purpose of Section F.

If this section is valid--and

I

it was held valid by the CA--Section C is unnecessary for the problem
at hand.

- 16 -

G.

c. )Federal Emergency Petroleum Al ,l ocation Act of 1973
The CA considered and rejected the contention that the
Maryland statute is inconsistent with and thus pre-empted
by the FEPAA. On this appeal, the issue is raised
by none of the appellants and by only one of the amici,
9

Champlin Petroleum Co., et al.

The State has filed an

objection to Champlin's motion for leave to file its brief,
alleging that, as to the commerce clause and Robinson-Patman
issues, Champlin's brief is duplicative and that, as to the
FEPAA issue, Champlin has no more than a remote interest
in the question. Moreover, the State asserts, Champlin
should not be allowed to raise a question "which, for good reasons,
appellants apparently felt should not be presented to this
Court."

To the extent that the State is worried about duplication

9

Champlin, et al, are companies engaged in the petroleum
industry in different capacities. Some are engaged in petroleum
_ production, refining, and marketing; others are engaged only
in petroleum refining and marketing. None of the amici group is
engaged in petroleum production or refining ·in Maryland. Some of
the amici group were and are engaged in marketing petroleum products
in Maryland through retail stations. Others are not now
engaged in any Maryland retailing.
The motion for leave to file alleges that each member of the
amici group is affected by the Maryland statute in that it affects
the allocation policies of those who are now marketing in Maryland
and forbids the opening of Maryland retail stations by those
companies in the amici group that are producers and refiners.

- 17 of arguments, I do not believe the filing of Champlin's brief
will present any great hardship to the State or to this Court.
As to the FEPAA issue,

Champlin's brief competently

sets forth a problem that is likely to be of recurring
importance and in which the amici group have a legitimate interest.
Because the other side of the FEPAA problem is well presented
iu -,the CA opinion, I again see little hardship to the State or
to the Court in allowing Champlin to file its brief (even though
the FEPAA issue is not addressed by the State in its motion to
dismiss or affirm).
All this having been said, however, I believe
that the FEPAA issue was correctly resolved below and does
not merit plenary consideration by this Court. The focus
of Champlin's attack is Section F of the Maryland statute.
It provides that during periods of shortages, producers, refiners,
and wholesalers shall "apportion uniformly" gasoline and special
fuels to all retail service station dealers "on an equitable
basis." Champlin.coutends that this provision
clashes with the FEPAA which provides for the promulgation of
regulations for the allocation of petroleum productions. Champlin
points to several factors affecting allocations · under the federal
regulations which may allow allocations on other than the
"uniform basis" required by Sectfon F.

- 18 . In considering this argument, the 'CA construed the
Maryland statute to avoid the problems that the appellants
there asserted that it raised vis-a-vis the FEPAA.

The

CA noted that, although the statute refers to allocation on
a uniform basis, it also states tmt allocation is to be on
an "equitable basis." "By thus modifying ·'·uniformly,·'·
it would appear that the[Maryland General Assembly]
contemplated that certain equitable factors might require
variations in an otherwise uniform scheme of gasoline and
special fuel allocation." CA opinion, App. at 3la.
I do not believe that, under this somewhat strained
interpretation, the Maryland statute is inherently in conflict
with the FEPAA. Conflicts in the application of the
two statutes can be considered when and if they arise.
d.) Robinson-Patman Act: A much more serious question of
possible state-federal statutory conflict is raised by the
appellants concerning the Robinson-Patman Act.

They contend

that Section D of the Maryland statute is irreconcilable with
Section 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman Act which provides that
a seller can rebut a prima facie case of price discrimination
violative of the Act ''by showing that his lower price . . . to any
purchaser or purchasers was made in good faith to meet an equally
low price of a competitor." See Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S.

- 19 231 (1951); FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S .. 505 (1971).
As noted supra, Section D of the Maryland statute requires
that suppliers of petroleum products must extend all price
reductions uniformly to all retail service stations supplied.
Appellants' argument boils down to the claim that Section 2(b)
allows exactly what Section D forbids.
i) In considering the alleged conflict between the
two statutes, the CA interpreted Section
a way as to avoid the conflict.

~(b)

in such

According to the appellants,

however, the CA's interpretation is inconsistent with
virtually all other interpretaions.
In Sun Oil Co., this Court specifically reserved
the question of whether the Section 2(b) defense encompasses
a situation where a supplier such as an oil company lowers its
price to a retail dealer to enable the dealer to meet · the lower
price of a competing retail dealer which lower price is subsidized
by a price reduction from that dealer's supplier.
The Maryland CA held that the oil companies' granting of such
"competitive price assistance" (or "voluntary allowances")
to t;hat supplier·• s dealers
to meet a price cut of a competing supplier--which is plainly
forbidden under Section D--is also not protected by Section 2(b)
because Section 2(b) applies only when the competitive offer is
made directly to the oil companies· own customers.

(

- 20 As appellants point out, this holding

answers the

question reserved in Sun in a manner contrary to federal
court authority as well as the stated policy of the FTC
and the Department of Justice.

FTC Report on Anticompetitive

Practices in the Marketing of Gasoline, 3 CCH Trade Reg. Rep.,
,10,373 at

18,~45

(1967); Dept. of Justice, Report on the

Robinson-Patman Act, 93-97 (1977); Bargain Car Wash Inc. v.
Standard Oil Co. (Indiana), 466 F.2d 1163, 1175-76 (7th Cir.
1972); Belliston v. Texaco Inc., 455 F.2d 175, 182 (lOth Cir.)
cert. denied, 408 U.S.

9~8.

But see

Note, Gasoline Marketing

and the Robinson-Patman Act, 82 Yale L.J. 1706, 1713 n. 44 (1973).
ii.) The appellants also note that, in contrast to what
they claim is their practice of tailoring price assistance to
a particular competitive situation, Section D requires them
to grant the same competitive allowance to

~

the dealers

they SUP?;¥ in Maryland when an allowance is granted to even one.
This does seem at odds with Section 2(b) which this Court has
interpreted as a section "designed to protect competitors in
10
individual transactions," and as one which guarantees to a seller
.
11
a pro-competitive right of self-defense to meet his competition.
10

FTC v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419, 431 (1957). See also
FTC v. A.E. Staley Manufacturing Co., 324 U.S. 746, 753 (1945).
11
Standard Oil Co. v . . FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 249 (1951).
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(

e) Importance of the Issues: As a number of the
iurisdictional statements and amici briefs point out, statutes
similar to that challenged here have been adopted or are being
considered by more than 25 states. (There is same disagreement
as to the exact number.) And,

the dual market structure--

where company-operated retail outlets compete with franchised
dealers--also exists in such industries as soft drink bottling,
./ automobile and truck dealerships,automotive

parts and service,

fast food restaurants, and non-food retailers.

To be sure,

there is not as much impetus for regulation of these industries
as there is with respect to the petroleum industry.

Still,

it is safe to say that the :Haryland sfatute does have some
precedential importance both outside of the state and outside of
the industry.
5. RECOMMENDATION:

In light of the decision below and

its potential significance, I believe that the "questions presented
[inthese appeal~ are so substantial as to require plenary consideration. '
Rule 15(l)(f) of the Sup. Ct. Rules.
There is a motion to dismiss or affirm.

8/26/77

Ellison

Trial Court and CA ops in
Joint Appendix

- 22 -

I

APPENDIX
Chapter 854 provides (italicized portions are those added
by Chapter 608):

"(B) After July 1, 1974, no producer o~ refiner of
petroleum products shall open a maJor brand,
secondary brand or unbranded retail service
station in the State of Maryland, and operate it
with company personnel, a subsidiary company,
commissioned agent, or under a contract with any
person, firm, or corporation, managing a service
station on a fee arrangement with the producer or
refiner. The station must be operated by a retail
service station dealer.
"(C) After July 1, 1975, no producer or refiner of
petroleum products shall operate a major brand,
secondary brand, or unbranded retail service
station in the State of Maryland, with company
personnel, a subsidiary company, commissioned
agent, or under a contract with any person, firm, or
corporation managing a service station on a fee
arrangement with the producer or refiner. The
station must be operated by a retail service station
dealer.
"(D) Every producer, refiner, or wholesaler of
petroleum products supplying gasoline and special
fuels to retail service station dealers shall extend
all voluntary allowances uniformly to all retail
service station dealers supplied.
"(E) Every producer, refiner, or wholesaler of .
petroleum products supplying g:1soline and special
fuels to retail service station dealers shall apply all
equipment rentals uniformly to all retail service
station dealers supplied.
"(F) Every producer, refiner or wholesaler of
petroleum products shall apportion uniformly all
gasoline and s pecial fuels to all retail SPrvice
station dealers during periods of shortages on an
equitable basis, and shall not discriminate among
the dealers in their allotments.
"(G) The Comptroller may adopt rules or
regulations defining the circumstances in which a
producer or refiner temporarily may operate a
previously dealer-operated station.
"(H) The Comptroller may permit reasonable
exceptions to the divestiture dates specified by this
section after considering all of the .relevant facts
and reaching reasonable conclusions based upon
those facts."
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
WASHINGTON, D . C. 20543
.
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February 15, 1978

MEMORANDUM TJ TH
Re:

COURT

Exxon C poration et al.; Shell Oil Co.;
Con· ntal Oil Co. et al.; Gulf Oil
Corporation; and Ashland Oil, Inc. et al.
v. Governor of the State of Maryland, et al.
Nos. 77-10, 77-11, 77-12, 77-47 and 77-64

The attached letter directed to the Chief
Justice refers to the motion for divided argument
in the above cases which has been distributed to
the Court with "in chamber matters" for Friday's
Conference.
•

I am somewhat nonplused since the request
for divided argument was filed by his office.

Attachment

,.RAN C I S

.JON F . OSTER

B. BURCH

GEORGE A

• rtOPN [Y 0[N [ FlAL

NILSON

DEPUTY ATTORN£ '!"~ OENCRAL

THE ATTORNEY

GENERAL

ONE SOUTH CALVERT STREET
14TH FLOOR

BALTIMORE , MARYLAND 21202
301 - 383 - 3737

January 31, 1978

The Honorable Warren E. Burger
Chief Justice of the
United States Supreme Court
Supreme Court Building
1 First Street, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20543
Re:

Exxon Corporation et al.; Shell Oil Company;
Continental Oil Company et al.; Gulf Oil Corporation;
and Ashland Oil, Inc., et al. v. Governor of the
State of Maryland et al.
Nos. 77-10, 77-11, 77-12, 77-47 and 77-64

My dear Mr. Chief Justice:
I apologize for writing to you directly on this
case, and I should state to you initially that I do not believe
my remarks which follow in any way prejudice or affect the rights
of the Appellants. I should also add that I do not believe that
my remarks are appropriate to any formal pleading before the
Court. I have no objection to the contents of this letter being
made available to the Appellants if you believe . it desirable
that I do so.
We have previously filed a Motion For Leave To
Divide Oral Argument. The case breaks down into two clearly
defined areas of the law, the commerce clause and the application
of the Robinson-Patman Act. While there is certainly some
intertwining of the two areas, as there must be in all cases, I
believe that the structure of this case lends itself to divided
argument particularly where the two attorneys whom I propose
for the argument have mutually exclusive experience and expertise
in the two areas of the case.
I ask for a favorable response to our Motion in

.

The Honorable Warren

~.

Burger

-2light of your suggestion to the State Attorneys General that
the quality
oral arguments in the Supreme Court by members
of their staffs has often failed to meet the degree of
excellence and importance which such arguments demand. On
at least one occasion, at which I was present in your company,
you asked the State Attorneys General to address themselves
to the question of whether they were sending to the Supreme
Court the best available people on their staff for oral
argument and whether they were insuring that the level of preparation for such arguments was receiving the necessary time
and attention. It is in the spirit of your request for the
best that I strive to put our best foot forward and ask that
we be permitted to split our argument .

oe

In the Court of Appeals of Maryland, where an
hour was allotted to each side for oral argument in this case,
we used one of my two Deputy Attorneys General and one of the
Assistant Attorneys General assigned to our Antitrust Division.
If our Motion is granted, we would again use the Deputy Attorney
General who argued the case below, and the Chief of the Antitrust
Division who is the most experienced attorney in my office in
antitrust law and who possesses the greatest degree of command
over the antitrust facets of this case. At the same time, I would
expect and instruct both attorneys to prepare themselves so that
they can answer questions in either area of the case but to
concentrate on the area of their particular assignment.
I should further point out that the Appellants
are represented by a panoply of attorneys too numerous to mention,
all of whom are well-versed in constitutional and antitrust law.
The brief of just four of the Appellants lists sixteen attorney s
and five law firms and there is no question in my mind that the
Appellants are provided with matchless legal representation in
terms of experience and expertise.
I am aware of the reasons why divided arguments
are discouraged and the potential deficiencies in such arguments.
However, I believe in the instant case the ability of the State
properly to present its case in oral argument and, therefore, to
assist the Court, will be inrrneasurably enhanced if such argument
can be divided. Thanking you for your kind consideration, I am
Respectfully yours,
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Franc~s .tr'. Burch
Attorney General of Maryland
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Dear John:
~ ~lease show at the end of the next draft of your
opinion that I took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.

..

Mr. Justice Stevens
lfp/ss
cc: The Conference
~:

,,

Sincerely,

